A note about the Confrontation Clause in criminal cases and Chester County DUI cases. This important clause applies to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania through its incorporation in the due process clause of the 14th amendment. In this particular case, in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. It drives a big issue in Chester County DUI cases, where a person who alleges you were driving (and then no police officer observes the driving) must be cross examined by a Chester County DUI lawyer.
An important Supreme Court case is noticed Crawford v. Washington. It states that the admissibility of out of court statements under the Confrontation Clause isn't applicable to all criminal proceedings. Prior case law found that the statement was considered to have sufficient indicia of reliability if it either fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or for a particular rise to guarantee of trustworthiness. Crawford however dramatically alters the interplay between the confrontation clause and the law of hearsay.
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court ruled that if a hearsay statement was testimonial nature, it could not be introduced at trial, in the absence of the declarant, unless the defendant had a previous chance to cross-examine the declarant. In this particular case, the previous chance to cross-examine the declarant could have occurred at a preliminary hearing. Crawford involved a tape recorded statement given by defendants wife to police describing the stabbing with which defendant was charged. The defendants wife invoked the state marital privilege, which afforded her the opportunity to not have to testify against her spouse during the proceeding. The wife statement however was admitted at trial over objection because the trial court determined that the statement had a guarantee of trustworthiness.
The Supreme Court in Crawford would change the legal landscape and stated that hearsay statements violate the accused rights under the confrontation clause. It stated that Crawford departed from prior confrontation clause jurisprudence by raising the bar on the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements made by unavailable declarants when there was no prior opportunity for cross examination. The Crawford court reaffirmed the importance of the right of confrontation and created a drastic distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements for confrontation clause purposes. Where testimonial statements are involved, the Court determined that the framers of the Constitution meant to leave the Sixth Amendmen'ts protection to issues relating to the rules of evidence more on the side of lack of reliability then on reliability. There is however an exception of admission for non-testimonial hearsay. In this case, where nontestimonial hearsay is an issue, it is wholly consistent with the framers of the Constitution's design for the state to have flexibility in the development of their case. So the fundamental question question remains, which rule applies with hearsay confrontation. In this particular case, where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indication of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the constitution actually dictated which is confrontation.